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A SCHOOL DIVIDED: A HISTORICIST LEGAL ANALYSIS 
OF GOOD SPIRIT SCHOOL DIVISION NO 204 V CHRIST 
THE TEACHER ROMAN CATHOLIC SEPARATE SCHOOL 
DIVISION NO 212 
Edward R (Ted) Lewis* 
ABSTRACT 
On the cusp of a judgment by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, this 
article examines the 2017 Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench decision 
in Good Spirit School Division No 204 v Christ the Teacher Roman Catholic Separate 
School Division No 212. In this case, the SKQB ruled that non-Catholic 
students attending a publicly funded Catholic school were not entitled to 
per-student funding grants administered by the provincial 
government. This article reviews the case using a historicist lens informed 
by the philosophy of Edmund Burke, which the author suggests is 
appropriate in the Canadian constitutional context. Through this 
constitutional lens, the author examines the constitutional history of 
separate school funding in Saskatchewan and other Canadian jurisdictions. 
The author suggests that this history reveals the premium on educational 
choice that has informed educational policy in Canada. With this history in 
mind, the article turns to the SKQB judgment. It suggests that the 
application of several of the key interpretive tools was flawed in light of this 
history, the development of Charter jurisprudence, and a richer 
understanding of “state neutrality” in the Canadian context.  
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In April 2017, the courthouse in Yorkton, Saskatchewan, became a battleground 
for one of the most contentious provisions of the Canadian constitution.1 In his 
judgment in Good Spirit School Division No 204 v Christ the Teacher Roman Catholic School 
Division No 212, Judge Donald Layh of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
(SKQB) ruled that non-Catholic students attending publicly-funded Catholic schools 
in Saskatchewan were not entitled to per-student grant funding administered by the 
province.2 The ruling provoked swift and critical reaction from parents, religious 
groups, and First Nations.3 The Government of Saskatchewan eventually invoked the 
notwithstanding clause in order to protect its educational funding regime.4 An appeal 
was also heard by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (SKCA) in March 2019. 
In advance of the impending appeal judgment, this paper examines the reasons 
for judgment in this very complicated case, and offers criticisms of these reasons. To 
these ends, the paper is broken down into two components. The first component 
deals with the critical methodology employed – a Burkean historicist approach – as 
well as relevant constitutional history leading up to the case. The constitutional history 
includes case studies of the legislative approach to public denominational education 
in select provinces. Finally, this part addresses relevant modern interpretive tools – 
most notably the denominational aspects test for s 93 protections articulated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.   
In the second part of the paper, the primary issues identified by Layh J, and his 
reasons for judgment in each, are examined.5 Criticism through the Burkean historicist 
lens is then undertaken. While not optimistic of concurrence at the appellate level, the 
paper suggests that there are problems with the application of the denominational 
aspects test in Layh J’s reasons. These include the problem of distinction between 
denominational aspects and non-denominational aspects that give effect to them, the 
 
1 Cf. Janet Epp-Buckingham, Fighting over God: A Legal and Political History of Religious Freedom in Canada (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen University Press, 2014) at 32.  
2 2017 SKQB 109 [Good Spirit]. 
3 “Parents, Indigenous leaders dread practical reality of Catholic school ruling” CBC News (26 April 2017), online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/parents-indigenous-leader-catholic-school-ruling-1.4087739>.   
4 Bill 89, An Act to amend the Education Act, 1995, 2nd Sess, 28th Leg, Saskatchewan, 2017 (assented to 30 May 
2018). 
5 Not all of the issues from the trial are considered in this analysis. See footnote 86. 
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use of historically static interpretive principles, and the potential for judicial 
manipulation the test. The paper also argues that Layh J’s conclusions do not sit 
comfortably with a rich understanding of Canada’s unique conception of state 
neutrality. Finally, it suggests that Layh J’s findings of violations of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms could (and arguably should) be saved under s 1.6 
PART I: HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Establishing a Burkean Historicist Framework 
As set out in the introduction, this paper intends to offer a historicist legal 
analysis of Layh J’s reasons in the Good Spirit decision. However, as the concept of 
historicism can be broad and somewhat elusive, it is necessary to set out its general 
nature and the specific branch that will be implemented in this analysis.  
In its most basic sense, historicism can be defined as a “mode of thinking in 
which the basic significance of specific social context [to social development] - e.g. 
time, place, local conditions - is central.”7 The thoughtful reader will, however, 
observe that such a definition fails to incorporate singularity. If historical and social 
context is at the root of human social development, it can be axiomatically presumed 
that there could be as many historicist interpretive methods as there are distinct 
societies - not all of which might be appropriate. The “looseness” of the definition of 
historicism is evident in the breadth of philosophers who incorporated and critiqued 
it.8  
Hegel, widely recognized as a foundational historicist philosopher, viewed 
history as the means of synthesizing the competitive principles of binding, universal 
morality and the “emancipation of the passions [of self-interested individuals] and 
their satisfaction.”9 Hegel’s foundational historicism suggests that the essence of any 
human social project, including a constitution, “can be sought only through 
 
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].  
7 “Historicism” Faversham Stoa (blog), online: <https://www.stoa.org.uk/topics/history/Historicism.pdf> 
[“Historicism”].   
8 Ibid.  
9 Pierre Hassner, “George WF Hegel”, translated by Allan Bloom, in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds, History 
of Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 732 at 739.  
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understanding that.”10 The breadth of this mode of social understanding is evident in 
the divergent positions of interpreters ranging from the Right Hegelians, who seized 
upon the organicism of Hegel’s thought as “a justification of the unique destiny of 
national groups,” to Karl Marx, whose theory of alienation is founded upon the 
disruption of the historical relationship between workers and their labour.11 Based on 
such philosophical company, a historicist framework must be defined with great care.  
Of the many philosophers who have incorporated elements of historicism into 
their work, the one most appropriate for the purposes of this analysis is Edmund 
Burke (b. 1729 - d. 1797). For most of his adult life, Burke served as a member of the 
British House of Commons. During his career, he amassed a wealth of written and 
oratory works that warned, in some of the most florid language imaginable, against 
the dangers that he perceived in the “revolutionary” philosophies of his day: “If there 
is one recurrent theme in Burke’s letters, speeches, and writings, it is emphasis on the 
moral and political evils that follow upon the intrusion of theory into political practice. 
It is theory as such that he rejects.”12 
Unlike Hegel or Marx, Burke’s historicist approach to social affairs is not 
theoretically established or primarily prescriptive in nature.13 Instead, his primary 
assertion is that the “direction of human affairs belongs to prudence; and instead of 
establishing what might be the best or legitimate state, he celebrates the genius of the 
British constitution. Burke’s political philosophy emerges from the elaboration 
of...two things, prudence and the British constitution.”14 This prudence, Burke 
emphasizes, is a “public and enlarged prudence” that is sovereign over all theoretical 
rights or metaphysical first principles.15 Thus, for Burke, any positive social or 
constitutional development is to be effected always through a prudential, cautious 
approach:  
By a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is 
watched; the good or ill success of the first gives light to us in 
the second; and so, from light to light, we are conducted with 
 
10 “Historicism”, supra note 7.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Harvey Mansfield, Jr, “Edmund Burke” in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds, History of Political Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 687 at 689 [Mansfield].  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. at 692.  
15 Ibid. at 693.  
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safety through the whole series. We see that the parts or the 
system do not clash. The evils latent in the most promising 
contrivances are provided for as they arise. One advantage is as 
little as possible sacrificed to another. We compensate, we reconcile, 
we balance. We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole the 
various anomalies and contending principles that are found in 
the minds and affairs of men.16 
For Burke, “slow but well-sustained” progress, and the essential unity of various social 
anomalies into a consistent whole, was the hallmark of the British constitutional order. 
Largely unwritten, this constitution  
does not have a lasting form… rather, it has order that is of no 
particular kind because its parts have variety and diversity. The 
parts represent interest that combine or oppose one another in 
that action and counter-action, which…, from the reciprocal 
struggle of discordant powers, draws out the harmony of the 
universe.17  
Burke’s constitutional philosophy, then, (as distinguished from positivist theories), is 
one in which a society achieves order through an organic struggle, through the 
achievement of compromise over protracted discordance.  
As a final note, it must be remembered that, given his socially contextual view 
of constitutional development, Burke emphasized the importance of history in 
creating excellent constitutions, informed by precepts extant throughout history: “we 
must regard the constitution as an inheritance, which means...not inherited from founders 
but as if it has come to us from no beginning.”18 
Burke’s Constitutional Philosophy Directly Translates to Canada 
With attention to the unique constitutional history of Canada, it may be 
suggested that Burke’s philosophy, which is linked to the organic nature of the British 
constitution, also lies at the heart of the great Canadian experiment.19 The preamble 
 
16 Edmund Burke, “Reflections on the Revolution in France” in The Harvard Classics at para 280, online: 
<http://www.bartleby.com/24/3/12.html>. Emphasis added.  
17 Mansfield, supra note 12 at para 698-99.  
18 Ibid at 700.  
19 Or at least the first round of Canada’s constitutional documents.  
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to the Constitution Act, 1867, confirms this reality with its recognition of the desire of 
the four original Canadian provinces to be federally united “into One Dominion...with 
a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom.”20 Observations of  our 
constitutional practices today reveal the continued operation of this principle in the 
recognition of the importance of the unwritten sources - those sources beyond lasting 
form -  in our Constitution to this day. 
The SCC affirmed the importance of unwritten sources in two important cases 
in the 1990s. In Reference re Remuneration of Judges, the court was called to consider 
“whether and how the guarantee of judicial independence of s. 11(d) [of the Charter] 
restricts the manner by and the extent to which provincial governments and 
legislatures can reduce the salaries of provincial court judges.”21 In his reasons for the 
majority, Lamer CJ found that “judicial independence is at root an unwritten 
constitutional principle, in the sense that it is exterior to the particular sections of the 
Constitution Acts. The existence of that principle...is recognized and affirmed by the 
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.”22 Further, in the Reference re Secession of Quebec, 
the court, while noting that “unwritten norms” could not be taken as an “invitation 
to dispense with the written text of the Constitution,” they were nonetheless 
“powerful normative force[s],...binding upon both courts and governments.”23 In its 
reasons, the court noted that Canada’s federal system is considerably informed by 
unwritten values.24 
These cases demonstrate the integral position that a Burkean analysis could 
occupy within conversations on Canadian constitutional interpretation today. In 
examining any constitutional provisions – including those at issue here – one must be 
attentive to unwritten constitutional norms, and informed by historical developments 
under which they arose. 
 
20 Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5 at Preamble 
[Constitution Act, 1867].  
21 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov Court of PEI; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov Cour t of 
PEI, [1997] 3 SCR 3, [1997] SCJ No 75 at para. 1.  
22 Ibid at para 83.  
23 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para. 54, [1998] SCJ No 61. 
24 Cf. Ibid. at para 55-60.  
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A HISTORICIST ANALYSIS ON THE HISTORICAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF S 93 REVEALS THE IMPORTANCE OF 
CHOICE 
Having established the importance of history in Canadian constitutional 
development and analyses, it is appropriate to offer a brief examination of the 
approach taken by the federal government and select provinces with respect to the 
provincial plenary power over education and its denominational exceptions under s 
93. An analysis reveals that while the broad objective of public morality weighed 
heavily in the development of schools, the element of choice was a concession won 
(primarily) by Canada’s Roman Catholics. This right of choice, for reasons that will 
be elucidated further, was improperly dismissed by Layh J in his judgement.  
Background: The Confederation Compromise 
The inclusion of the limitations on the provinces’ plenary powers with respect 
to education was a crucial part of Confederation arrangements. Dubbed the 
“confederation compromise” by Wilson J in Reference Re Bill 30, these limitations were 
placed on the plenary power as a remedy to “early conflict over religion...between 
Roman Catholic and Protestant education.”25 This conflict, a byproduct of the 
intensive involvement of churches in all aspects of schooling at that time, had led to 
a host of legislative restrictions being placed (generally) on Catholic education by 
Protestant majorities.26  
In the lead-up to Confederation, spurred by the concerns of the Catholic 
minority in Upper Canada (now Ontario) and the Protestant minority in Lower 
Canada (now Quebec), several of the Fathers of Confederation made assurances that 
protection for educational rights would be included as part of any constitutional 
arrangements.27 The Fathers’ attention to the need for choice was aptly summarized 
by Alexander Galt in an address to supporters: “There could be no greater injustice 
to a population than to compel them to have their children educated in a manner 
 
25 Reference Re Bill 30, an Act to amend the Education Act (Ontario), [1987] 1 SCR 1148 at para 64, [1987] SCJ No 44 
[Reference Re Bill 30]; Epp-Buckingham, supra note 1 at 36.  
26 Cf. Epp-Buckingham, supra note 1 at 36.  
27 Franklin A Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Upper Canada (Toronto: JM Dent & Sons (Canada) Ltd, 1955) 
at 292-293 [Walker].  
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contrary to their own religious belief…[such an injustice] could not be done...without 
sowing the seeds of discord in the community.”28  
The compromise envisioned by Galt and others was given its constitutional form 
primarily in ss 93(1) and 93(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867.29 S 93(1) that no provincial 
laws with respect to education “shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with 
respect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the 
Province at the Union.”30 Simply put, this provision guaranteed the rights of minority 
denominational schools in each province at such time as they entered into 
Confederation, which in turn created a patchwork of denominational rights across the 
country. S 93(3), meanwhile, guaranteed that where any separate (or, for our purposes, 
“denominational”) school system exists or is “thereafter established…an Appeal shall 
lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any Provincial 
Authority affecting any Right or Privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Minority of the 
Queen’s Subjects in relation to Education.”31 
Choice in religious education, then, was viewed by many of Canada’s founders 
as an imperative part of the Confederation arrangement. However, in light of the 
plenary power granted to the provinces with respect to education under s 93, the 
incorporation of such choice on the ground took different forms in different 
provinces. 
Nova Scotia: A Restrictive Approach 
Of the original parties to Confederation, Nova Scotia illustrates a more 
restrictive approach to the public funding of denominational schools - and, indeed, 
to denominational schools generally. In 1766, the Nova Scotia General Assembly 
banned the establishment of Roman Catholic schools, in an attempt to eliminate 
“popish religion” in the province.32 While this draconian measure did not persist 
indefinitely, the Nova Scotian approach to denominational education was less 
accommodating than that of other provinces. This was primarily due to the fact that, 
unlike jurisdictions in which a clear religious majority and minority existed 
 
28 Alexander Tilloch Galt, Speech Published in The Leader (28 November 1864), quoted in Ibid. at 293-294.  
29 Supra note 20.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
32 Epp Buckingham, supra note 1 at 36. 
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(specifically, Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia was home to “five dominant views 
of Christianity and a strong Jewish community.”33 It was for this reason that “in the 
1860s the government of Premier Charles Tupper rejected legislative guarantees for 
confessional schools...in favour of a single public school system where religion could 
be taught after hours.”34 Thus, Nova Scotia entered Confederation without an 
established school system, effectively opting out of s 93(1) in favour of a more unified 
approach in support to education that emphasized a “common morality and common 
nationality.”35 
Notwithstanding this approach, Catholic schools were, in the nineteenth century 
and beyond, permitted to operate in the province – a freedom that was jealously 
guarded by Catholic authorities against government encroachment.36 Furthermore, 
the element of educational choice continued to manifest itself in the political realm. 
For some time after Confederation, for instance, “some public schools operate as 
Catholic schools under ‘informal agreements’ with the public-school board. The 
Catholic Church would build a school and make it available to the public-school board 
on the condition that Catholic children could attend these schools and that the 
schools would be staffed by Catholic teachers.”37  
While the province’s informal arrangements with the Catholic Church did not 
ultimately persist, the anomaly indicates that the element of choice continued to rear 
its head in even the unlikeliest jurisdictions. Any uncertainty in this matter is dispelled 
with reference to the words of Sir Charles Tupper when he eventually became Prime 
Minister, speaking with reference to his provincial work in a debate on the Manitoba 
Schools Question: “I may say that the smooth working of the Education Act in Nova 
Scotia is due to the reason that...it has yet practically met the wishes of both Catholics 
and Protestants in Nova Scotia.”38 While the province’s political choice was unitary 
 
33 David Michels & David Blaikie, “Matters of Faith and Conscience: A Turning Point in the Taking of Oaths in 
Canada” in Derocher et al, eds, L’Etat canadien et la diversite culturelle et religieuse (Quebec: Presses de l’universite du 
Quebec, 2009) 49 at 63.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Robert Bedard, “Moral Education in Nova Scotia, 1880-1920” (1984) 14:1 Acadiensis 49 at 50.  
36 Michels and Blaikie, supra note 33 at 64.  
37 Anne Bayefsky and Arieh Waldman, State Support of Religious Education: Canada vs the United Nations (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) at 11.  
38 Sir Charles Tupper, “Speech before the House of Commons” (14 April 1896), online: 
<https://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/primeministers/h4-4057-e.html>. Emphasis added.  
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in nature, its success rested on the choice of both sides to compromise in regard to 
education. 
Ontario: An Evolutionary Approach 
The legal development of education for the Catholic minority in Ontario 
mirrored the tension between common morality and choice as in Nova Scotia, but 
under different demographic circumstances and with different results. In the early 
nineteenth century, Ontario’s population was majority Protestant and minority 
Catholic. The Common School Act of 1841 prevented the inclusion of Roman Catholic 
schools into a unified public school system.39 However, s. 11 of the act allowed that 
“any number of inhabitants of a different faith from the majority in such township  
or parish might choose their own trustees” and “establish and maintain one or more 
common schools” that would be eligible for the same government support as other 
common schools.40 An assortment of legislative provisions were passed throughout 
the 1840s and 50s, refining the rights of Roman Catholics and Protestants to receive 
instruction from teachers of their own “persuasion” and addressing assorted 
administrative matters.41 In the midst of these developments, in 1844, Egerton 
Ryerson was appointed Deputy Superintendent of Education for Canada West (now 
Ontario) in 1844. Ryerson was “determined to establish a free, publicly financed 
educational programme in the province, and “disliked the notion of separate 
schools.”42 His preferences aside, however, “as long as [such schools] were on the 
statute books he gave them the full benefit of the letter of the law.”43 
In the wake of these developments, and on the cusp of Confederation, the Scott 
Act was passed, forming “the basis of today’s separate schools” in Ontario.44 The last 
act on this matter passed prior to Confederation (and the consequent basis of existing 
rights under s 93(1)), the act guaranteed minority educational rights and “made 
permanent all the advantages granted to separate schools.”45 Such advantages 
 
39 Epp Buckingham, supra note 1 at 36.  
40 Robert M Stamp, The Historical Background to Separate Schools in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 
1985) at 1.  
41 Ibid at 2-4.  
42 Walker, supra note 27 at 57-58.  
43 Ibid. 59.  
44 Stamp, supra note 40 at 5.  
45 Ibid. 
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included their ability to be administered and funded like their common school 
counterparts - both of which, at that time, were concerned with elementary education 
alone.46 
Notwithstanding the Scott Act, Roman Catholics in Ontario had to guard the 
continued existence of their school system against a several legislative attacks, 
including such remedies as proposed constitutional amendments to eliminate their 
protections and, in 1890, legislation requiring that all school fees collected would be 
directed to the common system.47 A blow was also struck in 1928 in the judgment of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in The King v Tiny Township Separate 
School Trustees.48 On appeal from the SCC, the JCPC held that Roman Catholics were 
not entitled to operate public denominational secondary schools, and were not 
exempt from municipal taxation for secondary schools other than their own.49 This 
was based on the JCPC’s view that secondary schools, which were a novel 
development in education at that time, were not part of the extant rights entrenched 
at Confederation by s 93(1).50 However, in its judgment on the matter, the SCC had 
upheld the applications of the Tiny Roman Catholic board, saying that “to hold 
otherwise would be to render illusory in a most material particular the substantial 
protection to religious minority rights in regard to education which the Imperial 
legislation of 1867 was designed to assure.”51 The ruling left in its wake a system in 
which, for decades, Roman Catholic separate schools continued to operate at a 
financial disadvantage. 52 It is interesting to note that this was not the first case in 
which the JCPC overturned a domestic ruling on government funding of Roman 
Catholic separate schools.53  
However, by the 1960s, bolstered by a “new climate of tolerance” and in the 
wake of new increases in enrollment, the scales began to tilt in favour of funding for 
Roman Catholic schools.54 The culmination of this shift came in 1984, with the case 
 
46 Ibid.  
47 Epp Buckingham, supra note 1 at 39.  
48 [1928] AC 363, 3 DLR 753 [Tiny JCPC]. 
49 Stamp, supra note 40 at 12.  
50 Tiny JCPC, supra note 48 at pages 768-771.  
51 Tiny Separate School Trustees v The King, [1927] SCR 637, 4 DLR 857 at page 683. 
52 Stamp, supra note 40 at 31.  
53 Cf City of Winnipeg v Barrett, [1892] AC 445 (PC) [Barrett JCPC]. More on this under the Manitoba Schools 
Question, below.  
54 Cf Stamp, supra note 40 at 32.  
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of Reference Re Bill 30, in which SCC overturned the JCPC’s decision in Tiny.55 As noted 
previously in general terms, the ruling determined that the subject bill, which would 
extend full funding to Roman Catholic separate secondary schools, was constitutional 
under both s 93(1) and s 93(3). In her reasons for the majority, Justice Wilson adopted 
a purposive approach to Ontario’s legislative history, which allowed for the growth 
of the denominational school system into the current age:  
By section 7 of the Scott Act separate school trustees were given 
the same powers and duties as common school trustees…They 
also had a broad power…to determine the courses to be taught 
and to prescribe the level of education required to meet the 
needs of the local community. As Anglin C.J. [of the SCC] 
pointed out in Tiny this was not a mere practice tolerated by the 
educational authorities but was permitted by law. I believe the 
Privy Council was in error in holding that the existence of the 
Council's general regulatory power...nullified the trustees' power 
to provide a secondary level of instruction in their schools if they 
deemed it appropriate. It is clear that if the foregoing right was to be 
meaningful an adequate level of funding was required to support it.56 
Justice Wilson also found that public funding was protected under s 93(3). She 
supported this judgment with reference to the provinces’ plenary power over 
education.57 She further noted that , while the JCPC ultimately ruled in Barrett that the 
withdrawal of funding for Catholic schools in Manitoba was permissible, it had “never 
questioned the ability of the Manitoba Legislature to add to the educational rights and 
privileges of denominational school supporters if it saw fit to do so.”58 The effect of 
these statements is the strong suggestion that it was open not only to Ontario to 
 
55 Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25; Tiny 1928, supra note 48.  
56 Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25 at para. 59-60; Barrett JCPC, supra note 53.  
57 Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25 at para 21. It is interesting to note that Estey J, whose statements on the 
“axiomatic” nature of a Charter violation absent s 93 was central to Layh J’s analysis, issued his minority decision 
using s. 93(3) alone: “It would in my view be quite incorrect to conclude that the words "thereafter established" in 
s 93(3), and the appeal process found therein, only apply to provinces that at the time of Union had no publicly 
funded separate school system. There is no compelling reason to interpret so restrictively the words in s 93(3). In 
my respectful view, the plain meaning of the words "thereafter established" necessarily includes additional rights or 
privileges, such as full funding for secondary education in Ontario, that have been granted subsequent to 
Confederation and in addition to the minimum rights and privileges guaranteed in s 93(1). I conclude therefore 
that this post-Confederation legislative power of the province to legislate with respect to education includes the 
establishment of separate schools providing education at the secondary school level.” Ibid at para 69-70.  
58 Ibid. at para 25. Cf Brophy v Attorney General of Manitoba, [1895] AC 202 (PC) [Brophy].   
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extend denominational school funding post-Confederation, but to other provinces as 
well - and with a fair degree of discretion.  
In the decades following Reference Re Bill 30, Ontario has continued to maintain 
the most generous of Canada’s remaining publicly funded separate school systems.59 
The compendium of historical evidence that has been presented here indicates that, 
in spite of many attempts to limit such rights, the value of choice with regard to 
separate schools has been strongly affirmed by the SCC over time - and reflected in 
increases in enrollment in Ontario Catholic high schools that have been sustained.60 
The Manitoba Schools Question: A Question of Relevance to Saskatchewan 
In concluding the comparative historical analysis of this paper, it must be noted 
that the institution of publicly funded denominational students in Saskatchewan was 
directly informed by the Manitoba Schools Question, which dominated the Canadian 
federal election of 1896, and ultimately led to the defeat of Sir Charles Tupper’s 
Conservative government for its failure to address the situation in a timely way.61  
The controversy, which had been bubbling for some time in Manitoba with the 
rise of the Anglophone Protestant population and the decrease of the Francophone 
Catholic population, erupted in the wake of the provincial government’s decision to 
eliminate public funding for Catholic schools, and enforce general collection of 
revenue for public schools.62 Catholic Canadians were enraged by the decision, and 
litigation came before the courts in the cases of Barrett v City of Winnipeg and Brophy v 
The Attorney General of Manitoba.63 In the former case, a ratepayer refused to pay taxes 
in support of Manitoba common schools, and was taken to court. The latter case 
concerned an appeal by the minority with regard to the legislation by right under s 
93(3). 
 
59 Cf. Bayefsky, supra note 37 at 9; Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25.  
60 Stamp, supra note 40 at 32; Deani Neven Van Pelt et al, Where our Students are Educated: Measuring Student 
Enrollment in Canada (Fraster Institute, 2015), online: <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/where-
our-students-are-educated-measuring-student-enrolment-in-canada.pdf> [Fraser Institute].  
61 Stephen Azzi, “Election of 1896” in Canadian Encyclopedia, online: 
<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/election-1896-feature/>.  
62 Michel Verrette, “The Manitoba Schools Question” in Canadian Encyclopedia, online: 
<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/manitoba-schools-question/>.   
63 Barrett JCPC, supra note 53; Brophy, supra note 58.   
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Both cases reached the SCC, and were appealed to the JCPC. In Barrett, the JCPC 
held that the impugned provisions of the 1890 Act were intra vires, observing that “it 
is not the law that is at fault. It is owing to religious convictions which everybody 
must respect, and to the teaching of their Church, that Roman Catholics and members 
of the Church of England find themselves unable to partake of advantages which the 
law offers to all alike.”64 This decision was characterized as a “surprise” by one 
commentator, particularly when it was followed by the Brophy ruling in which a right 
of appeal was held to exist for the Manitoba Catholic minority – forcing the inert 
Conservative government to act on the issue.65 
Of particular interest here is the fact that the JCPC overturned a unanimous SCC 
ruling in Barrett, in which the choice of parents was held to be an integral part of 
Canadian education:  
The wishes of parents are entitled to the first consideration. This 
is the opinion of the Royal Commission on education appointed 
in England in 1886...This is an act which prejudicially affects this 
class of persons, as to their conscientious convictions, as to their 
pockets, in their relation to their church, in the most important 
matter of secular and religious education of their young. It is in 
most marked contradiction to the spirit of conciliation displayed in the act 
which dealt with these rights and to the wise spirit of toleration which is 
displayed in the enactment that was in force for 20 years, and offends against 
the spirit and the letter of the act.66 
The strength of this statement, within a historicist analysis denominational school 
funding rights in Saskatchewan, should not be unduly diminished. While the decision 
was ultimately overruled, it demonstrates that, in 1891 as in 1984 at Reference Re Bill 
30, the value of educational choice, while historically often the subject of legislative 
limitation, was an important value that informed denominational school rights in 
Canada.67 Under a Burkean historicist framework, this value must continue to form 
part of today’s debates on the issue. 
 
64 Barrett JCPC, supra note 53.  
65 Claude Belanger, “Barrett v The City of Winnipeg” (23 August 2000) Quebec History (blog), online: 
<http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/manitoba/1892-1.htm>.   
66 Barrett v The City of Winnipeg, (1891) 19 SCR 374, 1891 CanLII 61 (SCC) at 381. Emphasis added 
67 Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25.   
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MODERN INTERPRETIVE TOOLS 
At the outset of this section, it should be noted that, notwithstanding its 
seemingly anachronistic content, s 93 continues to operate by virtue of s 29 of the 
Charter, which states that “[n]othing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any 
rights or privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of 
denominational, separate or dissentient schools” – a further demonstration of the 
continuing recognition of the Confederation compromise by the drafters of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.68 Of course, interpretation of the continuing operation of the 
section has evolved over time, and given rise to modern methods of interpretation.  
Central among these methods is the “denominational aspects test,” which was 
articulated by Beetz J. in Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal.69 In that case, which 
challenged the implementation of a uniform curriculum for non-religious instruction 
in Quebec, the SCC held that s 93(1) protected “powers over denominational aspects 
of education and those non-denominational aspects that are related to denominational 
concerns which were enjoyed at the time of Confederation.”70 This test, under which 
the Protestant school board’s challenge was ultimately dismissed, forms an integral 
part of Layh J’s analysis and the critique offered in this essay. 
Having now examined the critical framework, relevant history, and interpretive 
principles, we may now turn to the Good Spirit case itself – and the questions that Layh 
J’s reasons have raised.  
PART II: ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM 
Good Spirit School Division v Christ the Teacher: A Summary 
Facts 
In 2003, the Yorkdale School Division decided to close the elementary public 
school that it operated in Theodore, a town of about 400 residents in southeastern 
 
68 Charter, supra note 6 at s 29. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
[Constitution Act, 1982]. 
69 Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 377, [1989] SCJ No 19 [Protestant 
School Board]. Summarized by Dickson J in Mahe v Alberta, [1990] 1 SCR 342 at para 73, [1990] SCJ No 19 [Mahe].  
70 Protestant School Board, supra note 69. 
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Saskatchewan. At that time, the school had 42 students enrolled. The school division 
determined that it would be best to bus these students to its school in Springside, a 
village 17 kilometres away. Unsurprisingly, many of the parents whose children had 
attended the Theodore Public School were unhappy with the decision. After lobbying 
at community meetings failed to reverse the decision,71 concerned parents of 
Theodore, who had banded together under the community “Save our School 
Committee,” decided to exercise the “last resort” of petitioning the provincial 
Minister of Education to create a Catholic School division in Theodore. They were 
ultimately successful in doing so and, after what Layh J described as “protracted 
negotiations,” the Theodore Roman Catholic School Division was established. It then 
purchased the former public school building and opened the St Theodore Roman 
Catholic School.72 While the school operated as a Catholic school, possessing “the 
attributes…and offer[ing] a program that accorded with the usual operation of a 
Roman Catholic separate school,” its student population was never majority 
Catholic.73 Layh J noted that, when the school was established, 13 of its 42 students 
(or 31 percent) were Catholic, and that this proportion had ranged over time from “a 
high of 39 percent to a low of 23 percent.”74   
The establishment of this school was significant to the Yorkdale School 
Division, which was eventually succeeded by Good Spirit School Division No. 204 
(GSSD), the amended applicant in the case. Under the Education Act, 1995 and the 
accompanying regulations, the Government of Saskatchewan maintains a funding 
system that, while complicated, can be summarized for the purposes of this paper by 
noting that “the largest component of government funding is tied to student 
enrolment [in public and/or separate schools]. Simply stated, the more students, the 
more government funding.”75 Subsequent government amendments to the act in 2009 
“set and capped province-wide mill rates [that is, the method of calculating property 
taxes] for education taxes respecting public school divisions.”76 While public schools 
were bound to this arrangement, public separate schools were able to set their own 
 
71 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 134.  
72 Ibid at para 1. 
73 Ibid at para 2. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid at para 16. Education Act, SS 1995, c E-o.2 [Education Act, 1995], Education Funding Regulations, RRS c. E-02. 
The impugned provisions are as follows: Education Act, s 53, s 85, s 87, and s 310; Education Funding Regulations s 3 
and s 4.  
76 Ibid at para 14. 
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mill rates and levy their own taxes.77 Simply put, the St. Theodore Catholic School 
had an additional means of gathering the necessary financial resources, while GSSD 
lost the funding that it would normally have received had Theodore’s non-Catholic 
students been transferred to the nearest local elementary school. As in so many cases, 
the application in this case was ultimately related to finances.  
In 2005, based on this loss of funding, GSSD commenced an action against 
Christ the Teacher School Board (the successor to the Theodore Catholic School 
Board) (CTT), as well as the Government of Saskatchewan. For a remedy, GSSD 
sought a declaration that the relevant sections of the Education Act, 1995 and the 
pursuant regulations are unconstitutional “to the extent that they provide funding to 
educate non-Catholic students attending separate schools.”78 CTT and the 
government defended the action on the basis that the government’s funding model 
was protected under s 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 – and, in the alternative, that 
there was not Charter violation, and further that, if a violation was found, it could be 
justified under s. 1.79  
Relevant Constitutional and Legislative Provisions 
GSSD’s application attracted a Charter analysis of the relevant Education Act 
provisions under s. 2(a), which guarantees to individuals the “fundamental...freedom 
of conscience and religion,” and s. 15(1), which states that “every individual is equal 
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit 
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based 
on...religion.”80  
In light of the province-specific protections designated by ss 93(1), 
Saskatchewan’s public denominational schools are also subject to the protections for 
such schools that existed at the time of its entry into Confederation. A relatively late 
entrant into the union, Saskatchewan was carved out of the vast area that formerly 
constituted the North-West Territories under the Saskatchewan Act, 1905.81 With 
respect to education, this bill applied an amended version of s 93 to the province, 
 
77 Ibid at para 15. 
78 Ibid at para. 10. Education Act, 1995, supra note 75.  
79 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20; Charter, supra note 6, s 1.  
80 Charter, supra note 6 at s 2(a) and s 15(1). Emphasis added.  
81 Saskatchewan Act, 1905, 4-5 Edw VII, c 42 [Saskatchewan Act].  
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which affirmed the application of the denominational exceptions under s 93 as well 
as chapters 29 and 30 of the Ordinances of the Northwest Territories.82 Of particular 
application among these ordinances was The School Ordinances, 1901, which provided 
inter alia a process by which educational ratepayers of the minority denomination of 
any given district in the province (be they Catholic or Protestant) to petition the 
government for the establishment of their own denominational school district.83 Such 
districts would possess “all rights, powers, privileges and be subject to the same 
liabilities and method of government as is herein provided in respect of public school 
districts” and ratepayers funding such districts would be relieved of obligations to pay 
taxes in support of public schools in their area.  
The effect of s 17 of the Saskatchewan Act was the entrench the School Ordinance 
among the constitutional documents relevant to the consideration of s 93 in 
Saskatchewan.84 The ordinance therefore forms a key additional component of Layh 
J’s analysis, to which we may at last turn.  
Issues 
Based on the applicable constitutional and legislative provisions, Layh J had to 
consider several discrete issues. Each issue examined in this essay is reproduced 
below, along with a summary of the judge’s reasons on each.85  
Issue 1: Do ss 93(1) and 93(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 protect government action that 
funds non-Catholic students at St. Theodore Catholic School from Charter scrutiny? 
On the issue of the application of these sections, Layh J observed that both 
parties “seemingly agree that s 93(1) freezes and entrenches separate school rights so 
long as such rights fall with the doctrine called the ‘denominational aspects’ test.”86 
However, while the parties ostensibly agreed on the use of the test for s 93(1), they 
disagreed on its application to s 93(3) in light of statements made by Wilson J in 
Reference Re Bill 30.87 In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) considered the 
 
82 Ibid, s 17. The School Ordinances, 1901, ONWT 1901, c 29 [School Ordinance]. 
83 Ibid s 41-45.  
84 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 81; School Ordinance, supra note 82.  
85 In addition to the issues considered below, Layh J also ruled on whether GSSD was entitled to standing in the 
application, whether the St. Theodore School was a separate school for the purposes of the application, and 
whether the impugned provisions violated s. 15 of the Charter. This essay does not review these issues – though 
there may be grounds upon which they too may be criticized.  
86 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 167. Refer to Part 1 for the introduction of this test.  
87 Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25. 
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constitutionality of full public funding for Catholic high schools in Ontario. In finding 
that such funding was constitutional under both sections, Justice Wilson observed 
that  
s 93(3) rights and privileges are not guaranteed in the sense that 
the s 93(1) rights and privileges are guaranteed, i.e. in the sense 
that the legislature which gave them cannot later pass laws which 
prejudicially affect them. But they are insulated from Charter attack 
as legislation enacted pursuant to the plenary power in relation to education 
granted to the provincial legislatures as part of the Confederation 
compromise.88 
Layh J ultimately sided with the applicant’s position that the denominational 
aspects test applied to both sections on the basis that either nascent or complete 
iterations of the test had been applied to both sections in previous cases. He noted 
that Wilson J had tacitly affirmed the test by observing that, although separate schools 
enjoyed some immunity from Charter scrutiny, their position was not absolute.89 This 
position was, he believed, buttressed by the court’s subsequent statements in Adler, in 
which the court found that, pursuant to ss 93(1) and (3), there was no Charter violation 
in the Government of Ontario’s decision to fund only Catholic schools to the 
exclusion of all other religious denominations.90  
Layh J further observed that unreasonable results would be yielded if the 
denominational aspects test were applied only to existing separate school rights under 
s. 91(1), but not to s 93(3). Specifically, the government could, pursuant to the plenary 
power of education and s 93(3), create any system of separate schools without concern 
for the application of the Charter.91 Building on this observation, he noted that case 
law suggested that the government could not use s 93(3) as a carte blanche mechanism 
to avoid Charter scrutiny - and that there had been “no similar attempt in other 
jurisdictions to support post-union legislation in the face of a Charter challenge.”92 
 
88 Ibid at para 64. Emphasis added.  
89 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para. 203.  
90 “...all of this is not to say that no legislation in respect of public schools is subject to Charter scrutiny, just as this 
court’s ruling in Reference Re Bill 30 did not hold that no legislation in respect of separate schools was subject 
to...scrutiny”: Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609 at para 49, [1996]  SCJ No 110 [Adler].  
91 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 216-218.  
92 Ibid at para 221.  
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Finally, he held that the historical evidence presented by the defendants, having been 
used to establish that “funding for non-Catholic students was a guaranteed right under 
the 1901 ordinances,” could not be converted into support for the application of ss 
93(3) on post-Confederation rather than pre-Confederation rights.93 
Issue 1A: Is the funding of non-Catholic students a right found under the 1901 Ordinances? 
Layh J found that a right to funding for non-Catholic students in Catholic 
schools was not protected under the Ordinances.94 His finding began with the basic 
premise that “the reason for the existence of separate schools was to ensure that after 
the first public school was created in a school district, parents of the minority faith 
could separate their children from the majority’s children to inculcate their children 
in the minority’s faith.”95 This, he said, was the true intention behind the 
Ordinances.96  
To support this premise, Layh J relied on several legislative and social 
developments. These included the movement through subsequent ordinances 
towards greater state control of schools;97 the fact that the “solemn pact” made at 
Confederation to protect minority religious education was (in his opinion) limited to 
the four original provinces;98 changing social norms and religious positions;99 the need 
to avoid amplifying the right;100 the fact that implicit rights “in law” could not be read 
in absent explicit language;101 that, with reference to non-minority students’ choice to 
attend, s 93 rights were to be anchored in law rather than voluntary practice;102 the 
fact that Catholic teaching at the relevant time was far less inclusive of other students 
(though not totally exclusive);103 and that the essence of s 93 rights concerns the need 
to separate and immerse a child in the given minority faith.104 
Issue 2: Is the funding of non-minority faith students at St. Theodore Catholic School a 
constitutional right under s 17(2) of the Saskatchewan Act? 
 
93 Ibid at para 227. 
94 Ibid at para 258.  
95 Ibid at para 259.  
96 Ibid  
97 Ibid at para 281.  
98 Ibid at para 295.  
99 Ibid at para 312.  
100 Ibid at para 316.  
101 Ibid. at para 317. 
102 Ibid at para 335. 
103 Ibid at para 335.  
104 Ibid at para339. 
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Under this issue, Layh J rejected the government’s arguments the lawsuit could 
be dismissed on the “non-discriminatory” provision under the Saskatchewan Act, 1905, 
at s. 17(2). He believed that it could not have been intended “to create a second public 
funded school system to provide choice to parents.”105 He dismissed the notion that 
the religious freedom of non-Catholic parents was violated in the absence of funding 
on the basis of Adler, referencing Sopinka J’s statement that “nothing in the...Act 
prevents [the parents] from exercising this aspect of their freedom of religion.”106 He 
disagreed with the leveraging of freedom of religion arguments in support of a 
provision that, in his estimation was concerned primarily with inequality.107 “Separate 
schools,” he ultimately found, “were not created to give rights or choice to the 
majority. They were created so that a minority faith could separate their children from 
the majority.”108 
Issue 3: Does government funding violates s 2(a) of the Charter? 
Having found that a non-minority right to funding was not protected under any 
of the applicable statutory or constitutional provisions, Layh J then found that the 
contested provisions of the Education Act violated s. 2(a) of the Charter. His finding 
was founded on a statement in Estey J’s minority judgment in Reference re Bill 30, in 
which the justice observed that, if the Charter had any applicability to the bill in 
question, a breach would be “axiomatic” - that is, self-evident.109 Moving beyond the 
ostensibly self-evident violation of s. 2(a), Layh J engaged in a discussion of the 
obligation of state neutrality within the context of this issue. He cited the seminal case 
of Big M Drug Mart, affirming Dickson CJ’s statement that “[t]he protection of one 
religion and the concomitant non-protection of others imports a disparate impact 
destructive of the religious freedom of society.”110 For more recent authority, he relied 
heavily on Gascon J’s judgment in Mouvement laique quebecois v Saguenay (City), and 
specifically his observation that “the evolution of Canadian society has given rise to a 
concept of neutrality according to which the state must not interfere in religion and 
 
105 Ibid at para 350.  
106 Adler, supra note 90 at para 171.  
107 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 355.  
108 Ibid. at para 357.  
109 Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25 at para 79; Ibid at para 369.  
110 R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 98, [1985] SCJ No 17 [Big M], quoted in Good Spirit, supra note 2 
at para 381. 
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beliefs. The state must remain neutral in this regard.”111 On the question of whether 
a school division (rather than an individual) could make a claim for religious freedom, 
Layh J drew a distinction from the Amselem case, which dealt with a prima facie neutral 
law, and the overtly partial provisions of the Education Act.112 He also referenced Big 
M, in which a corporation was able to obtain relief under the Charter.113 
Issue 4: Does s 1 of the Charter justify a violation? 
In the final (and surprisingly brief) portion of his Charter analysis, Layh J ruled 
that the impugned provisions of the Education Act were not saved by s. 1 of the Charter: 
“[The Charter] guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a fee and 
democratic society.”114 Pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence, the judge applied the 
test from R v Oakes.115 In his reasons, Layh J summarizes the steps as follows: (1) a 
sufficiently important objective to justify the limitation, (2) a rational connection 
between the law and the objective, (3) the law must impair the right by the “least 
drastic means,” and (4) the law must not have a disproportionately severe effect on 
the persons to whom it applies.116 The burden of proof for a s. 1 application rested 
upon the defendants.  
In the first step, Layh J was unconvinced by the government’s stated objectives 
of “equitable educational opportunity” and the provision of choice.117 On the former 
issue, he observed (without explicit reference to evidence) that other provinces 
“seemingly meet this objective [of opportunity for education regardless of where 
students live] without separate schools.”118 In the latter case, he made the perplexing 
remark that the advancement of this argument “[acknowledged] what I have already 
found violative of Charter rights: choice given to some parents based on religious 
beliefs, but not to others, is a breach of the state’s duty of religious neutrality.”119 
 
111 Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 at para 72, Gascon J [Saguenay].  
112 Ibid. at para 403-404. Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at paras 46-47, Iacobucci J [Amselem].  
113 Ibid at para 407-410; Big M, supra note 110.  
114 Charter, supra note 6 at s. 1.  
115 [1986] 1 SCR 103, [1986] SCJ No 7, Dickson CJ [Oakes]. 
116 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 449.  
117 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 451-454.  
118 Ibid at para 452.  
119 Ibid at para 54.  
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Layh J then bundled the remaining steps under the umbrella of 
“proportionality.”120 He found no rational connection between the stated objective 
that the Government must ensure sufficient funding for all schools, regardless of 
creed or religion and the funding of non-Catholic in Catholic schools.121 He 
determined that the “the best (and perhaps only) way that the government can 
minimally offend its duty to remain religiously neutral is to accept s 93 without 
augmentation.”122 Finally, he found harm in “the thwarting of public school boards’ 
decisions to close rural schools that have experienced diminishing enrolments.”123 In 
concluding remarks, he endorsed McLachlin CJ’s observation that “proportionality 
under s. 1…[needs to encourage] ‘a more tolerant harmonious multicultural 
society’...These goals might justify otherwise Charter-infringing legislation, not the 
defendants’ assertion that legitimate goals include parental choice.”124 
Remedies and Aftermath 
Having found Charter violations that were not saved under s. 1, Layh J declared, 
pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, that the relevant portions of the 
Education Act, 1995, and the Education Regulations were unconstitutional “to the extent 
that the Government of Saskatchewan has provided funding grants to separate 
schools respecting students not of the minority faith,” and that they were of no force 
and effect.125 With a view to the “significant repercussions” of the decision on 
Saskatchewan’s educational system, he stayed the declaration to June 30, 2018.126 In 
the aftermath of the decision, as noted, the provincial government invoked  s 33 of 
the Charter (the “notwithstanding clause”) in order to carry on the effect of the 
provisions, and the SKCA granted leave for and heard the appeal.127  
 
120 Cf ibid at para 457-467.  
121 Ibid at para 458 
122 Ibid at para 459. 
123 Ibid at para 460.  
124 Ibid at para 465.  
125 Ibid at para 475; Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 68, s 52(1): “The Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, 
and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no 
force or effect.” Education Act and Education Regulations, supra note 75.  
126 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 476.  
127 Charter, supra note 6, s 33.  
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Analyzing the Decision 
At this point in the analysis, it should be recalled that Layh J ruled that 
protections to the impugned funding regime in Saskatchewan could only be protected 
by s 93(1) or 93(3), or the Ordinances, so long as they fell within the denominational 
aspects test. As part of his analysis, he joined the right to funding for denominational 
schools with the historical purpose that “parents of the minority faith could separate 
their children from the majority’s children to inculcate their children in the minority’s 
faith.”128 On this basis, he was ultimately dismissive of the government’s arguments 
that the provisions effect educational choice for parents.129 Layh J also seriously 
questioned the applicability of the “solemn pact” of Confederation to 
Saskatchewan.130 
On the latter point, it is difficult to accept that there could be no basis for the 
application of the Confederation compromise to Saskatchewan in light of the 
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.131 The final line of the preamble, which states 
with foresight that “Provision be made for the eventual Admission into the Union of 
other Parts of British North America,” seems to confirm the opposite - a fact that 
Layh J seems to have overlooked.132  
On the former issue, a survey of applicable case law and legislative history does 
not provide for the easy resolution of the tension between legislative remedy and 
choice. However, it does confirm that the element of choice has continuously 
informed the debate. Rather than dismissing such considerations on the basis of the 
most current legal interpretations, it may behoove judicial authorities to consider these 
rights as informed by this ever-present yet evolving factor, and not simply in relation 
to the system at the time of implementation. A Burkean perspective expects the 
possibility of a workable solution that transcends the immediate temporal 
constitutional context, and would help to properly give effect to the right in light of 
these norms.  
The Denominational Aspects Test: Application and Flaws 
 
128 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para. 259.  
129 Ibid at para 451-454.  
130 Ibid at para 295.  
131 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20. 
132 Ibid, Preamble.  
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In support of his decision that the right to funding of non-Catholic students was 
not protected from Charter scrutiny, Layh J asserted that funding could not be 
considered a denominational aspect or a non-denominational aspect necessary to give 
effect to denominational concerns at the time of confederation.133 However, the 
application of this test raises three problems: (1) the trouble with drawing the 
distinction between a denominational right and the non-denominational means of 
effecting it, (2) the logical problem that results in freezing a denominational right in 
view of freedom of religion, and (3) the evident manipulability of “denominational” 
categories by the judiciary. 
The distinction between denominational and non-denominational aspects is not well-drawn in the 
context of school funding 
This point has been dealt with to a certain extent in the foregoing analysis, but 
it bears repeating that the SCC has ruled on multiple occasions that the extension of 
funding to denominational schools can be protected under the denominational 
aspects test.134 Layh J imputed the test to Wilson J’s analysis in Reference Re Bill 30, in 
which such funding was ultimately protected.135 Furthermore, the very case from 
which the test is ultimately drawn approvingly cited the appellate judge in his 
observation that financing constitutes a non-denominational aspect necessary to give 
effect to denominational guarantees.136 While the court has maintained that there is a 
distinction between the two categories, these cases seem to indicate a possible 
problem with the absolute distinction between funding for denominational schools 
(as a non-denominational aspect) and the execution of the aspects that fall within their 
denominational core - a possibly false dichotomy that is evocative of Tarnopolsky’s 
observations on the sterility of a right for which there are no means of efficacy 
(ancillary protections, funding, etc.).137 
Fixing denominational rights to a point at history demonstrates logical inconsistency in the 
denominational aspects test 
 
133 Mahe, supra note 69; Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 198.  
134 Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 25; Protestant School Board, supra note 69.  
135 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at 198. 
136 Protestant School Board, supra note 69 at para 56.  
137 Cf. WS Tarnopolsky, “The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: Administration and Enforcement of Human Rights 
Legislation in Canada” (1968) 46 Can Bar Rev 565 (excerpt).  
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Layh J correctly observed that, at the time of the enactment of both the 
Constitution Act, 1867 and the Ordinances, the Catholic Church was anxious to insulate 
its student population from what it perceived to be the harmful influences of 
society.138 The church’s views on education at the time was summarized 1897 by Pope 
Leo XIII:  
[I]t is necessary that [children] should be formed on those 
principles which, deeply engravers on their consciences, they 
ought to follow and obey, because they naturally spring from 
their faith and religion. Without religion there can be no moral 
education...For the Catholic there is only one true religion, the 
Catholic religion; and, therefore, when it is a question of the 
teaching of morality or religion, he can neither accept nor 
recognize any which is not drawn from Catholic doctrine.139 
Over time, however, the educational views of the Catholic Church changed (a 
fact also acknowledged by Layh J).140 The Vatican adopted a growing emphasis on 
ecumenism, which promotes increasing dialogue with other religions. The adoption 
of the principle in Catholic education is on full display in Pope Paul VI’s encyclical 
Gravissimum educationis: “Cooperation is the order of the day...every means should be 
employed to foster suitable cooperation between Catholic schools, and between these 
and other schools that collaboration should be developed which the good of all 
mankind requires.”141 
By asserting that the right to funding for public Catholic schools is tied to the 
church’s nineteenth century conception of educational policy, Layh J’s analysis leads 
one to consider a possible outcome of his line of reasoning: if the distinction between 
a denominational and a non-denominational aspect is difficult to draw, and the non-
denominational aspect is protected only insofar as it was at Confederation, does it 
also protect only the denominational aspects of the denomination as they existed at 
that point? If such were true, it would run contrary to the court’s articulation of 
 
138 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 257.  
139 Pope Leo XIII, “Affari vos: Encyclical on the Manitoba Schools Question” (18 December 1897), Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, online: <http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-
xiii_enc_08121897_affari-vos.html>.  
140 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 392.  
141 Pope Paul VI, “Gravissimum Educationis: Declaration on Christian Education” (28 October 1965), Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, online: <http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_gravissimum-educationis_en.html>.  
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freedom of religion, which the SCC described as follows in Syndicat Northcrest v 
Amselem:  
freedom of religion consists of the freedom to undertake 
practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in 
which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or 
is sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as 
a function of his or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a 
particular practice or belief is required by official religious 
dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious 
officials... 
But, at the same time, this freedom encompasses objective as 
well as personal notions of religious belief, "obligation", precept, 
"commandment", custom or ritual.142 
This definition offers a strong endorsement of the wide right of an individual (or 
group) to determine the content of their denomination. Notwithstanding legal 
limitations that have been imputed to s 93,143 affixing the denominational aspects test 
to a particular point in history clashes with the ability to determine the content of 
one’s religion - clashing with the “purposive” interpretation of Charter rights applied 
by the SCC since its introduction.144 
The denominational aspects test can be manipulated 
The foregoing analysis is not meant to indicate that Layh J was suggesting 
interference in the dogmatic aspects of Catholic education. It is meant, however, to 
demonstrate the difficulty in drawing the lines between denominational aspects and 
non-denominational aspects necessary to give them effect, and the difficulty with 
Layh J’s decision to index the latter to the operation of Catholic schools at a particular 
point in time. These difficulties suggest that the denominational aspects test may 
ultimately be inappropriate for the purposes of s 93 analyses, given the manipulability 
of the test by the judiciary.  
 
142 Amselem, supra note 112.  
143 Protestant School Board, supra note 69 at para 35: “As a constitutional text, s 93(1) may deserve a ‘purposive’ 
interpretation but, in so doing, courts must not improperly amplify the provision's purpose.” 
144 Cf. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc ., [1984] 2 SCR 145, SCJ 
No 36.  
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An extreme example (and an admitted outlier) demonstrating the potential for 
manipulation is the case of Hall v Powers, in which it was determined that a Catholic 
school could not prohibit the attendance at prom of a gay student and his boyfriend.145 
In his consideration of “denominational aspects” with relation to s 93, MacKinnon J 
of the ONSC observed that it is “obvious that the educational system of [Ontario] is 
not frozen in time...educational methods change...It is difficult to imagine how the 
legislature of Ontario can effectively exercise [its] power [under s 93] unless it has a 
large measure of freedom to meet new circumstances.”146 Following this statement, 
MacKinnon proceeded to find that denying Hall’s ability to attend the prom with his 
boyfriend based (in part) on “evidence [of] a diversity of opinion within the Catholic 
community on pastoral care regarding homosexuality.” It is not clear whether he 
reached this conclusion with or without evidence of the Catholic Church’s catechism 
provision condemning homosexual behaviour.147 
It should be acknowledged here that Hall, as an interim decision, is not a 
concrete authority that by itself suggests malleability in the test. However, one may 
find strands of possible judicial manipulation in other cases. Indeed, in Amselem (its 
flagship case on the scope of s 2(a) of the Charter), the SCC acknowledged that the 
determination of religious belief involves an “objective” component – begging the 
question of who ultimately adjudicates what qualifies as a legitimate belief attracting 
the protection of section.148 Recently, the SCC considered whether certain Aboriginal 
spiritual beliefs attracted Charter protection in Ktunaxa v British Columbia.149 The court 
ultimately held that the Ktunaxa’s beliefs in Q’atmuk, the Grizzly Bear Spirit, were 
not within the scope of s 2(a) because their freedom to hold and manifest their beliefs 
was not infringed by government actions in favour of a proposed development that 
would drive the spirit permanently from Jumbo Valley.150 The case is suggestive of 
the fact that the SCC is willing to circumscribe certain religious rights. Regardless of 
rationale or indeed necessity, the fact that judges can effectively rule on the legal 
 
145 George Smitherman in his capacity as litigation guardian of Marc Hall v. Powers et al.; Canadian Foundation for Chi ldren, 
Youth and the Law, Intervenors [Indexed as: Hall (Litigation guardian of) v. Powers], 59 O.R. (3d) 423, [2002] O.J. No. 
1803, MacKinnon J.  
146 Ibid at para 42.  
147 Catechism of the Catholic Church, Entry 2357 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), online: 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P85.HTM>.  
148 Amselem, supra note 112. 
149 2017 SCC 54. 
150 Ibid.  
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legitimacy of certain beliefs means that no interpretation of what is “denominational” 
can be taken as fixed. 
Lest this devolve into a debate into the merits of particular doctrines or overall 
religious legitimacy, which is not the point of this analysis, let us reinforce the point 
of this brief discussion: these cases raise questions about the efficacy of how 
“denominational aspects” are determined under this test. The SCC has stated in 
absolute terms that “courts should avoid judicially interpreting and thus determining, 
either explicitly or implicitly, the content of a subjective understanding of religious 
requirement.”151 While it is not suggested that this analysis is totally determinative in 
the Good Spirit decision, it raises questions with regard to the application in this case. 
Ultimately, this author is of the view that the “determination of what constitutes a 
Catholic school is reasonably best left to the Catholic Church, which welcomes non-
Catholic students into its schools.”152 
The Finding of a Violtion of s 2(a) in this Case Sits Uncomfortably with the 
Unique Nature of “State Neutrality” in Canada 
As with his s 93 analysis, Layh J’s finding that s. 2(a) was violated on an axiomatic 
basis given “the Government’s duty of religious neutrality owed to the collective 
citizenry” deserves further scrutiny through the Burkean lens.153 Specifically, his 
analysis begs consideration of the extent to which state neutrality applies in Canadian 
law.  
In Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay, Gascon J observed that “the Canadian 
Charter [does not] expressly impose a duty of religious neutrality on the state.”154 The 
Charter itself recognizes in its preamble the “supremacy of God,” which was found in 
the Zylberberg dissent to “lend credence to the view that a strict separation of church 
and state is not contemplated by the Charter.”155 In the case of McBurney v the Queen, 
it was observed that “it is not stretching matters to say that even in the modern, secular 
 
151 Amselem, supra note 112 at para 50.  
152 JK Donlevy et al, “Money, Law, and Religion: Non-Catholic Students in Saskatchewan’s Catholic Separate 
Schools: The Theodore Case” (2011) 22:2 EAF Journal 61 at 71. 
153 Good Spirit, supra note 2 at para 379.  
154 Saguenay, supra note 111 at para. 71.  
155 Zylberberg et al and Director of Education of Sudbury Board of Education; League for Human Rights of B'Nai Brith Canada et 
al, Intervenors [Indexed as: Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education (Director)] (Ont CA), 65 OR (2d) 641, [1988] OJ No 
1488, Lacourciere J [Zylberberg].  
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age the advancement of religion is rooted in our law and in our Constitution.”156 In 
the context of separate schools, MH Ogilvie postulated that the position afforded the 
Catholic Church in the wake of Reference Re Bill 30 is that of a “quasi-established” state 
church.157 While ultimately not determinative,158 these observations do cast doubt on 
the suggestion of absolute religious neutrality in Canada, in comparison with 
jurisdictions like the United States, which constitutionally guarantees the separation 
of Church and state.159  
The softer approach to religious neutrality demonstrated in this vein of case law 
presents an interesting factor in another (and often overlooked) social reality in 
Canada. It is trite to observe that there has been a decline in religious beliefs and 
practices in Canada. Census data from the 1970s on has shown a general trending 
increase in Canadians who identify no religion.160 However, this may not be tell the 
whole story. Sociologist Reginald Bibby, for instance, has challenged the assumption 
that declining attendance at religious services indicates that Canadians are no longer 
religious.161 “Canadians,” says Janet Epp-Buckingham, “are still asking spiritual 
questions and seeking answers even though they may not find them in institutional 
settings.”162 
Like the case law above, these observations are not determinative in Canadian 
law. Indeed, the fact that state neutrality is not a written norm means that the duty 
results from an “evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion” – a 
development that could be acceptable from a Burkean perspective.163 The purpose in 
 
156 Lyle McBurney (Plaintiff) v Her Majesty the Queen (Defendant)., 84 DTC 6494 at 6496.  
157 MH Ogilvie, “What is a Church by Law Established?” (1990) 28:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 179 at 235. Reference Re Bill 
30, supra note 25.  
158 The SCC has, with the exception of clear-cut exemptions under s 93, endorsed an increasingly stronger division 
between church and state on issues ranging from Sunday shopping legislation to prayer in schools and at city 
council meetings. Cf. Big M, supra note 110, Saguenay, supra note 111; Zylberberg, supra note 155.  
159 US Const amend I, § 1: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion…” 





D5=0&D6=0>.   
161 Reginald Bibby, Restless Gods: The Renaissance of Religion in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 2002), quoted in Epp 
Buckingham, supra note 1 at 19.  
162 Epp Buckingham, supra note 1 at 19.  
163 Saguenay, supra note 111 at 71. The acceptability of this development of the “unwritten” norm of state neutrality 
to a Burkean would also be contingent on the absence of positivist intervention. However, the SCC’s more 
aggressive approach to state neutrality in cases like Saguenay would likely be at odds with this.  
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examining these realities, however, is to further inform a historicist critique of Layh 
J’s judgment with the fact that there are still competing observations at play within 
the concept. There are profound difficulties that arise with judicial intervention on 
religious interpretation and state neutrality within the unique Canadian context. And 
these matters, while not determinative of the violative nature of a law under the 
comparatively recent and prescriptive Charter, should (from a Burkean perspective) at 
the very least form part of an assessment of an analysis under s. 1.  
A Historicist and Legal Analysis Reveals Flaws with the s 1 Analysis 
As noted, the test for the justification of a Charter violation under s. 1 is drawn 
from R v Oakes.164 In establishing the test, Dickson CJ made several observations. 
First, “any s. 1 inquiry must be premised on the understanding that the impugned 
limit violates...rights and freedoms that are part of the supreme law of Canada.”165 
Second, while the court must guide the values inherent to Canada’s “free and 
democratic” society, such rights are not absolute: “It may become necessary to limit 
rights and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise would be inimical to the 
realization of collective goals of fundamental importance.”166 The steps under which 
Dickson stated that the violation of a right could be justified under s. 1 are twofold: 
(1) an objective of “sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally 
protected freedom” i.e., pressing and substantial, beyond trivial; and (2) the 
establishment of a reasonable and demonstrable justification under the 
proportionality test - which, as Dickson noted, will “vary depending on the 
circumstances.”167 However, it includes the necessary components of a rational 
connection between the legislation and the objective, a minimal impairment of the 
right or freedom in question, and proportionality between the effects of the measure 
and the objective.168 
The court has had occasion to apply and refine the Oakes test in countless cases 
since 1986. For a recent refinement of the test, one may look to the case of R v J(KR).  
In this case, the SCC considered provisions adopted between the commission of 
sexual offences by the accused and the trial, which led to an order banning the accused 
 
164 Oakes, supra note 115.  
165 Ibid at para 63.  
166 Ibid. at para 65.  
167 Ibid. at para 69-70.  
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from using the internet. The court ultimately found that the resulting violation of s. 
11(i) of the Charter was justifiable.169 Statements by Karakatsanis J in the majority 
judgment are particularly illustrative of the court’s approach to the final step of the 
proportionality analysis:  
It is...at this final stage that courts can transcend the law's 
purpose and engage in a robust examination of the law's impact 
on Canada's free and democratic society “in direct and explicit 
terms.” In other words, this final step allows courts to stand 
back to determine on a normative basis whether a rights infringement 
is justified in a free and democratic society. Although this 
examination entails difficult value judgments, it is preferable to 
make these judgments explicit…170 
The normative approach described by Karakatsanis J in this case is echoed in 
the court’s statements in other cases. In Thomson Newspapers, the court noted that the 
third stage of the proportionality test “provides an opportunity to assess, in light of 
the practical and contextual details which are elucidated in the first and second stages, 
whether the benefits which accrue from the limitation are proportional to its 
deleterious effects.”171 Similarly, in Hutterian Brethren v Alberta, the court approvingly 
cited (but admitted they did not always follow) the assessment of this step offered by 
Aharon Barak:  “the test of proportionality (stricto sensu) examines whether the 
realization of this proper objective is commensurate with the deleterious effect upon 
the human right. ... It requires placing colliding values and interests side by side and 
balancing them according to their weight.”172 
It is within this background that flaws in Layh J’s s 1 analysis become clear. First, 
in assessing the pressing and substantial objective of parental choice, Layh J notes that 
“in suggesting that a pressing objective for funding non-minority faith students is to 
give a ‘substantial number parents a choice as to the education of their children’, CTT 
acknowledges what I have already found violative of Charter rights: choice given to 
some, but not to others, is a breach of the state’s duty of religious neutrality.”173 The 
effect of this finding, as Michelle Biddulph observes, is to seemingly incorporate the 
 
169 R v J(KR), 2016 SCC 31, Karakatsanis J.  
170 Ibid at para 79. Emphasis added.  
171 Thomson Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney General), 1 SCR 877, 159 DLR (4th) 385 at para 125.  
172 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2009 SCC 37 at para 76.  
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proportionality analysis, or the harms of the violation, into the threshold portion of 
the Oakes test.174 Biddulph goes on to note that Layh J’s reasoning in this vein 
suggests 
that the ‘choice’ here enures only to Catholic parents, i.e. that 
only Catholic parents may choose to send their child to Catholic 
or public school. This assumption begs the question. It 
presupposes the outcome of the s. 1 analysis by implicitly 
assuming that only Catholic parents may send Catholic children 
to Catholic schools, and therefore, only Catholic parents have a 
choice between two publicly-funded school systems.175 
Ultimately, Layh J’s presentation of the issue in this part of the judgment seems to 
use his ultimate conclusion as his reasons - only Catholic students are entitled to per-
student public funding for Catholic separate schools.176  
With regard to minimal impairment, Biddulph notes a further apparent error in 
Layh J’s application of the test by suggesting that he creates an impossible standard 
for the government to demonstrate such minimization. In his reasons, he stated that  
the Government must also demonstrate through evidence that 
the funding of non-Catholic students only minimally interferes 
with the state’s obligation to remain religiously neutral. In my 
view, the best (and perhaps only) way that the government can 
minimally offend its duty to remain religiously neutral is to 
accept s 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867...and not augment or 
complement these unbalanced religious rights with further 
empowering rights.177 
This method, Biddulph observes, endorses an all or nothing approach that suggests 
that there are no circumstances in which the government could ever demonstrate a 
reasonable limitation in this area. But this line, of course, is not reflective of reality: 
“the standard is minimal impairment, not no impairment.”178 
 
174 Michelle Biddulph, “We Don’t Need No (Catholic) Education – But Why Can’t It Be Saved by Section 1? A 
Comment on Good Spirit School Division No 204” (2017) 80 Sask L Rev 359 at 372 [Biddulph].  
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Finally, against the foregoing contextualization of the final step of the 
proportionality analysis, Layh J ultimately endorses his preferred value-laden 
approach, backed (it must be admitted) by extensive historical analysis assembled by 
counsel on both sides: the harm, he says, is summarized ultimately in “the thwarting 
of public school boards’ decisions to close rural schools which have experienced 
diminished enrollments.”179 Layh J seems ultimately to endorse, on the basis of state 
neutrality, the paramountcy of public education alone, with the current provisions 
causing only harms (and no listed benefits). And it is on the basis of this one-sided 
analysis that the compendium of historical and normative evidence compiled herein 
is introduced.  
As demonstrated, the value of choice, while it has ebbed and flowed historically 
in relation to the level of sectarian conflict in Canada, has remained a constant in the 
sphere of denominational education - a fact that should be given due weight when it 
is proposed as a salutary effect at the final stage of the proportionality analysis. The 
impugned measures, while they protect it within a specific denominational context, 
offer at least an option for spiritual education - which could well be considered a 
salutary effect since it ultimately provides a spiritual educational option for the many 
Canadians who are highly spiritual, if not strictly religious. While state neutrality is at 
this point an overarching principle in Canadian society, “absolute neutrality,” as 
Justice Deschamps once noted, “does not exist...[and] absolutes hardly have any place 
in the law.”180 Perhaps most importantly, the practical future of the 21.9% of students 
in Saskatchewan’s publicly funded Catholic schools (or roughly 10,000) weighs against 
Layh J’s decision.181 Honouring the choices of Theodore’s families irrespective of 
airtight religious compartments – and indeed those of the many other Saskatchewan 
and Canadian non-Catholic families who have chosen public Catholic schools for 
various reasons – is perhaps the most significant salutary effect. Indeed, it was 
primarily on this basis that the Government of Saskatchewan, in the face of the 
“significant repercussions” of the decision, decided to invoke the notwithstanding 
clause.182 The government's choice is more reflective of the practical reality for the 
many non-Catholic students affected by Layh J’s decision - and which is simply not 
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well addressed by his more rigidly categorical approach, which rests uncomfortably 
Burke’s more organic school of thought.183 
CONCLUSION 
In offering a conclusion to this paper, it may be best to start with what it does 
not conclude. First, the research shows that, while funding has been protected in many 
cases up to this point, the issue framed in this way, i.e., between the absolute division 
between Catholic and non-Catholic students, has not been directly considered up to 
this point by higher courts. However, it should be noted that, with regard to the 
admission of non-denominational students, the SCC has appeared to use lines of 
reasoning similar to Layh J’s in this case, opening the question of what appellate 
decisions on this case might yield, should leave to appeal be granted.184 
The historical analysis should also not be taken as a complete contradiction of 
the extensive historical content upon which Layh J based his decision. While it was 
not possible to review it all here, it is enough to say that Layh J’s historical analysis as 
presented does not appear to yield outright falsehoods.185  
Instead, this paper, using a Burkean historicist lens, has attempted to articulate 
an alternative constitutional perspective through which the issue may be considered. 
It has used a comparative historical analysis of select Canadian jurisdictions to 
establish that the value of choice in education, while it has faced obstacles, could be 
considered historically applicable Canada as a nation. It has attempted to highlight 
issues with one of the main interpretive tools put to use, the denominational aspects 
test, by demonstrating its clash with freedom of religion, and its general manipulability 
and inconsistent outcomes. It has attempted to show that the principle of state 
neutrality, upon which a Charter violation was ultimately founded, is not so absolute 
as we might think. Throughout each of these steps, it has also (hopefully) given the 
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at para 272-293.   
242 A SCHOOL DIVIDED Vol. 28 
 
 
reader a sense of the fact that Catholic education has evolved with Canada, and that 
its structures are embedded in the provinces that retain public funding for them – a 
practical reality that cannot be easily dismissed. 
Beyond the case commentary discussed herein, there has been little additional 
work located in the period following Layh J’s judgment. As noted, the Saskatchewan 
government has since invoked the notwithstanding cause, while an appeal was heard 
by the SKCA in March 2019. Commentators in the legal community are few – 
possibly due to the complications and relatively specific nature of the applicable law 
in this case. Additional commentary has focused more on the government’s use of 
the notwithstanding clause than historical or philosophical examinations. Leonid 
Sirota, for instance, has criticized the failure of the government to justify its use of 
the clause: “The government doesn’t say that it disagrees with Layh J’s views about 
the scope of religious liberty…It is content to state the objective of ‘school 
choice’…as if the end justifies the means, and it is permissible to disregard Charter 
rights as soon as one has a worthwhile reason for doing so.”186 This criticism has been 
echoed by media commentators such as Andrew Coyne.187 Perhaps all interested 
parties, having offered initial reactions, are awaiting the results of the appeal.  
In advance of these results, this paper concludes that, taken at their sum, 
historical and practical realities are not likely to save the impugned provisions of the 
Education Act from a Charter violation. The preponderance of case law promoting a 
more aggressive approach to state neutrality post-Charter is far too significant to be 
dismissed.188 However, in light of the SCC’s elaboration of the Oakes test, these 
realities could and should be given further consideration under the broader normative 
considerations of s. 1 – perhaps saving the law from suspension. The presence of 
these norms throughout the constitutional history of Canada, and the incredible 
complexity of the constitutional provisions themselves when viewed in context, 
demand a most prudential approach to judicial developments in this area – an 
approach that, to paraphrase Canadian philosopher George Grant, is reflective of 
what was, at least once, the “inchoate [Canadian] desire…[for] a society with a sense 
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of order and restraint.”189 The outcome of the appeal, and the potential government 
response, will suggest whether Canada’s courts and elected representatives agree.  
 
189 George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1995) at 82. It must 
be admitted that Grant, a Hegelian throughout much of his life, despaired of the prospect of his hope for a more 
“conservative” Canada in line with Burkean principles. However, the poesy of his vision for Canada remains 
evocative today. 
 
 
 
 
 
